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Abstract
Turkey, which has a democratic and secular political system with a 
predominantly Muslim population and an EU membership prospect, 
had an increasing influence in its region which increased its soft 
power. However, after the start of Arab uprisings, uncertainty in the 
Middle East and stall of the negotiations with the EU challenged 
Turkey’s soft power. This article discusses challenges and prospects 
facing Turkey’s regional power, especially since 2011. It firstly analyses 
the role of soft power in Turkish foreign policy and evaluates the 
series of soft power instruments. Secondly, it discusses the external 
factors challenging Turkey’s regional power, particularly the role of 
Arab uprisings, particularly Syrian crisis and domestic challenges that 
negatively influence Turkey’s regional power, particularly stagnation 
in the reform process, polarisation of the society, freedom of media 
and the rise of terrorism. Lastly the role of EU in Turkey’s soft power 
in spite of its decreasing transformative power over Turkey in recent 
years will be evaluated.
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Introduction
Joseph Nye (2008) defined power as ‘the ability to affect others to 
obtain the outcomes you want’, with three main ways to affect the 
other’s behaviour: ‘Threats of coercion, inducements and payments and 
attraction that makes others what you want’. The term ‘soft power’1 was 
first used by Nye (2004, p. 5), who defined it as ‘the ability to shape the 
preferences of others’. If others follow the lead of the power holder due to 
the power of attraction, we can speak of soft power. Soft power resources 
include cultural attraction, ideology and international institutions. 
1) This concept was introduced by Joseph Nye in his 1989 book which is called 
“Bound to Lead”.
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Legitimacy and credibility are necessary conditions for the existence of 
soft power, because ‘if a state can make its power seem legitimate in the 
eyes of others, it will encounter less resistance to its wishes’ (Nye, 1990, 
p. 167). While ‘hard power’ assumes an emphasis on the agent, ‘soft 
power’ emphasises the significance of others’ perceptions of the agent 
(Oğuzlu, 2007, p. 82-84).
Nye (2008, p. 106) argues that part of the USA’s soft power comes 
from the openness of its society and its free press, Congress and courts 
that can criticize and correct government policies. While soft power was 
firstly introduced to counter the belief in the US’ global decline, it has 
been also used in relation to ‘the foreign policy discourse of mid-range 
regional powers like Turkey’. In particular, many Turkish foreign policy 
scholars claim that Turkey’s soft power, particularly in the Middle East, 
has increased in the first decade of the 21st century2 (Demiryol, 2014, p. 7).
If a country has soft power, other countries want to follow it as 
an example, admiring its values, level of prosperity and openness. 
In international politics, soft power usually depends on a country’s 
values, the example set by its domestic policies, and its relations with 
others. Public diplomacy is an instrument that governments use to 
communicate with and attract the publics of other countries. However, 
it should be emphasized that ‘if the content of a country’s culture, 
values and policies are not attractive, public diplomacy that broadcasts 
them can not produce soft power’ (Nye, 2008, p. 94-95). Nye (2008, 
p. 101-108) also argues that ‘good public diplomacy has to go beyond 
propaganda’. While providing information and selling a positive image 
is part of public diplomacy, the latter also involves building the long-
term relations that create an ‘enabling environment for government 
policies’. In this way, public diplomacy can be used as an instrument to 
promote a country’s soft power.
In 2003, Nye (2009, p. 160-161) introduced the concept of ‘smart 
power’ in order to counter the misunderstanding that only soft power 
can produce effective foreign policy. While Nye defines hard power as 
‘the use of coercion and payment’, he defines ‘soft power’ as ‘the ability 
to obtain preferred outcomes through attraction’. The major elements 
of soft power include a country’s culture and values, so long as they 
2) For further detail see Tarik Oguzlu, “Soft Power in Turkish Foreign Policy”, 
Australian Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 61, No. 1, 2007; Meliha Benli Altunışık, 
“The Possibilities and Limits of Turkey’s Soft Power in the Middle East”, Turkish 
Studies, Vol. 10, No. 2, 2008.
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are attractive, and its policies, if they are practised in a consistent way 
and perceived as legitimate and inclusive. The instruments of soft 
power include public diplomacy, development assistance and exchange 
programmes. However, he also argues that there is a necessity for smart 
strategies that combine the instruments of both hard and soft power. 
He proposes that these can be combined as ‘smart-power strategies’ that 
can be used together, although this requires ‘contextual intelligence’, 
based on realistically understanding both the strengths and limits of the 
country’s power. Nye (2008, p.94) argues that public diplomacy is also 
an instrument of ‘smart power’, but ‘smart public diplomacy requires an 
understanding of the roles of credibility, self-criticism and civil society 
in generating soft power’.
During the Cold War era and in the 1990s, Turkey was considered 
mostly as a ‘hard power’. In the first decade of the 21st century, several 
internal and external developments have positively contributed to Turkey’s 
soft power. As a secular, democratic state with a predominantly Muslim 
population, an official candidate of the EU since 1999, Turkey developed a 
growing regional influence since September 11. Especially, after the Arab 
Spring, there were discussions on whether Turkey’s political and socio-
economic transformation can provide an example or an ‘inspiration’ for 
opposition forces in the Arab world (Benli Altunışık, 2011, p. 1).
While in its first (2002-2007) term of office, the Justice and 
Development Party (JDP) government gave priority to the EU accession 
process, in its second term (2007-2011), it  developed a multi-dimensional 
approach to Turkish foreign policy.3 In particular, Turkey tried to 
contribute to regional peace through constructive engagement and 
mediation efforts in its neighbouring regions. Turkey’s ‘zero problems 
policy’ also contributed to its soft power, including a liberal visa policy 
with its neighbours and increasing economic, political and cultural 
communication and cooperation. Turkey was constructed in the first 
decade of the 21st century as a ‘central country’. Turkey has started to use 
public diplomacy to communicate with various countries, with Turkish 
language courses and cultural centres being established in different parts 
of the world. There has also been a rise in interest in Turkish language 
3) For further detail see Selcen Öner, “Europeanization of Turkish Foreign Policy and 
Increasing Multidimensional Approach”, EurOrient, “Turquie: La Nouvelle Politique 
Exterieure Turque Entre Le Mythe ‘Europeen’ et la Nostalgie ‘Ottomane’” (The New 
Turkish Foreign Policy between the European Myth and the Ottoman Nostalgia”), 
No:35-36, 2011, p.217-236.
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and culture, especially with the rising popularity of Turkish soap operas 
in the Middle East and the Balkans. 
During the third term of the JDP government (2011-2015) the Arab 
Spring was the main challenge for Turkey’s soft power. The strategy 
of promoting and projecting Turkish culture externally, is insufficient 
as long as hard power and uncertainty dominate in the Middle East 
(Benli Altunışık, 2011, p. 2-3). Turkey’s soft power in the Middle East 
has also been challenged by other countries that perceive this region 
as crucial for their own geostrategic interests (Beng, 2008, p. 38). As 
Oğuzlu (2007, p. 95) argues, if threats and challenges to Turkey’s own 
security continue to increase, it will lead to an increase in Turkish 
tendencies to revert to acting as a hard power. For example, growing 
tensions between Turkey and Syria, stalled negotiations with the EU, 
and the loss of momentum in Turkey’s domestic reform process, 
particularly regarding freedom of speech and media, have negatively 
influenced Turkey’s soft power. Turkey’s ability to exert soft power in 
the Middle East is also dependent on ‘undertaking necessary reforms 
at home to make Turkey’s development attractive and persuasive to 
others’ (Beng, 2008, p. 22). For Turkey’s regional soft power to recover, 
will require its domestic reform process to regain its earlier momentum 
and improvements in its democratic credibility.
This article discusses the challenges and prospects facing Turkey’s 
soft power, especially since 2011, during the JDP government’s third 
term and the fourth term since 2015. It firstly analyses the role of soft 
power in Turkish foreign policy and evaluates the series of soft power 
instruments. Secondly, it discusses the stagnation in the reform process 
and the domestic challenges facing Turkey’s soft power, particularly 
deficiencies in freedom of speech and freedom of press, and lastly 
the role of external factors which include the role of Arab uprisings, 
particularly Syrian crisis and the role of the EU in Turkey’s soft power.
The Development of Instruments for Turkey’s Soft Power
Turkey used various foreign policy tools in dealing with neighbouring 
regions, including public diplomacy, and developmental assistance. 
The primary institutional instruments of Turkey’s soft power are TIKA 
(Turkish International Cooperation and Development Agency), which 
provides developmental assistance to many countries, and the Institute of 
Public Diplomacy, which plays a crucial role in ‘promoting Turkey’s image 
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abroad’ (Demiryol, 2014, p. 9). In addition, Yunus Emre Turkish cultural 
centres have been established in different parts of the world, especially in 
neighbouring regions, to promote Turkish language and culture abroad.
In 2010 the Office of Public Diplomacy was established within the 
Turkish Prime Ministry. Turkey’s public diplomacy has two main pillars: 
‘from state to society’ and ‘from society to society’. The first focuses on 
explaining Turkish government policies and activities to an international 
public. The second uses civil instruments, such as CSOs, research institutes, 
the press and universities (Kamu Diplomasisi, 2010) for communication 
activities. The goal of this public diplomacy is to increase Turkey’s 
visibility in international public opinion. Activities involve science and 
technology, economy, tourism, culture, arts, foreign aid and media, which 
help to inform world public opinion about Turkey. By coordinating these 
activities, the Office of Public Diplomacy tries to support Turkey’s strategic 
efforts to communicate and promote itself effectively internationally 
(Vizyon ve Misyon, 2010). İbrahim Kalın (2011, p. 5-10), former head of 
the Office of Public Diplomacy, defines public diplomacy as a platform for 
the implementation of soft power, arguing that its influence extends from 
the Balkans to the Middle East and Central Asia.
The activities of Turkish public diplomacy include conference series 
of ‘wise men’, journalist group programs, country programs, meetings 
with representatives of the foreign press, promotional activities, public 
diplomacy panels, foreign policy workshops, Europe meetings and the 
İstanbul Global Forum, held for the first time in October 2012 with the 
participation of politicians, academics, writers, journalists and artists. 
The conference series of ‘wise men’ aims to bring foreign politicians, 
intellectuals, journalists and specialists to Turkey, such as Seyyid Hüseyin 
Nasr and George Friedman, while the journalist groups program aims 
to invite journalists from the foreign press to Turkey so that they can 
attend meetings with Turkish journalists, media representatives and 
research institutions. The goal of meeting representatives of the foreign 
press in Turkey is to give them a chance to come together regularly with 
Turkish decision-makers, who can inform them about various policies 
and recent developments in Turkey. The country programmes involve 
meetings held abroad that aim to bring together foreign researchers and 
specialists on Turkey with their Turkish colleagues. Public diplomacy 
panels that include specialists and high-level bureaucrats are organized 
each month in a different Turkish city with the cooperation of the local 
university. Foreign policy workshops are also held in different cities and 
External and Domestic Challenges and Prospects for Turkey
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include academics and foreign policy makers. Europe meetings involve 
academics and thinkers specialised on European identity and culture to 
conduct discussions about the future of Europe (Faaliyetler, 2010).
By abolishing visa requirements for citizens from neighbouring 
countries like Syria, Egypt, Lebanon and Iran, Turkey strengthened its 
soft power by increasing interactions with these countries. For example, 
it allowed Turkish Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) and business 
organisations to become more active in neighbouring regions. As a state 
institution operating under the Turkish Prime Ministry since 1992, 
TIKA is regarded as a key foreign policy instrument for increasing 
regional cooperation in the Middle East, Caucasus, Central Asia, Balkans 
and Africa (Kaya and Tecmen, 2011, p. 13). TIKA deals with a range 
of projects in education, health, restoration, agricultural development, 
tourism and industry, with Programme Offices being established in 12 
other countries in 2002, before expanding to 33 offices in 30 countries 
in 2012. Whereas Turkey’s development funds amounted to 85 million 
US dollars in 2002, by 2011 it reached 1.273 billion US dollars (TIKA, 
2013). According to the 2013 Global Humanitarian Assistance Report, 
Turkey was the fourth largest humanitarian aid donor in 2012 after the 
USA, the EU and the UK (cited in Aydın-Düzgit and Keyman, 2014). 
This overseas development assistance programme is in accordance with 
Turkish foreign policy’s rhetoric of a ‘historical responsibility’ towards 
neighbouring regions (Elman, 2013, p.3). For example, a scholarship 
programme was incorporated in TIKA that enables an increasing number 
of overseas students from Turkey’s neighbourhood (Kirişçi, 2011, p. 42).
Turkey’s cultural diplomacy is carried out within the scope of 
Turkish foreign policy under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, although the Ministry of Culture and Tourism also participates 
in the promotion of Turkish culture abroad (Kaya and Tecmen, 2011, p. 
18), not only to foreigners but also to Turkish communities abroad. In 
accordance with a multi-dimensional foreign policy, the government has 
implemented a multi-dimensional strategy to promote Turkey abroad, 
covering a broad spectrum ranging from economy and trade to culture, 
from social development to education and cultural diversity. In order to 
promote Turkey internationally, exhibitions, ‘Turkey Week’ and ‘Year of 
Turkey’ events and festivals are organized; Turkey also participates in 
each country’s existing festivals and cultural events, while conferences 
on Turkish foreign policy are organized and promotional publications 
and documentaries are produced. For instance, in 2003, 2008, 2009 and 
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2013, a ‘Year of Turkey’ was proclaimed in Japan, Russia, France and 
China respectively. In 2009, which was proclaimed as ‘Turkish Season’ in 
France, 600 cultural, social, political, economic and scientific activities 
were organized, constituting the most comprehensive and longest series 
of events and promotion campaign realized abroad by Turkey in an 
EU country. Turkish Cultural Centres, established by the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, have the goal of promoting ‘Turkish culture, language 
and art and to contribute to bilateral relations between Turkey and 
other countries, as well as to help Turkish citizens in their adaptation 
to the country in which they live’. In addition, Turkish Language and 
Literature Departments and Turkish courses have been established in 
foreign universities, supported by lecturers and technical equipment 
provided by Turkey (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2012).
As well as these initiatives, the Yunus Emre Institute was established 
in 2007 to promote Turkish culture, society and language abroad. It aims 
to conduct research to improve the promotion and teaching of Turkish 
culture, history, language and literature, and to support scientific studies 
by cooperating with various foreign organizations and informing 
the wider public by publicizing the results of such activities. It also 
contributes to the training of academics and researchers concerned with 
Turkish language, history, culture, art and music and provides training 
through certification programmes. The institute helps to establish 
Yunus Emre Turkish Cultural Centres to promote Turkish language, 
culture, arts and history in several countries. These centres promote 
Turkey through cultural activities, scientific projects and courses, while 
aiming to increase cultural exchanges with other countries (Yunus Emre 
Institute, 2013). The locations of the centres reflect an emphasis on 
the Middle East and the Balkans which fits with the common cultural 
heritage approach of Turkish foreign policy (Kaya and Tecmen, 2011, p. 
11). Chairs for Turkish studies have also been established in prominent 
universities abroad to increase the number of studies on Turkey in 
international universities and to establish a discussion platform about 
Turkey in the public opinion of foreign countries. One example is the 
establishment of the ‘Chair of Contemporary Turkish Studies’ at the 
London School of Economics (LSE) (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2012).
Thus, Turkey successfully introduced several new institutions and 
instruments in the first decade of the 21st century that contributed to 
Turkey’s soft power, such as the Office of Public Diplomacy and Yunus 
Emre Centres, especially in neighbouring regions. However, Turkey’s 
External and Domestic Challenges and Prospects for Turkey
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soft power faces several recently emerging internal and external 
challenges. Externally, these challenges became more obvious after 
the Arab uprisings, particularly after the Syrian crisis while there was 
stagnation in the negotiations between Turkey and the EU, domestically 
the challenges include the problems in the field of freedom of speech 
and freedom of media and the rise of terrorism.
External Factors Challenging Turkey’s Soft Power
Several internal and external developments strengthened Turkey’s soft 
power during the first decade of the 21st century. The main internal 
development that changed Turkish foreign policy was that the JDP 
Party, which has an Islamist origin, came to power in 2002, bringing 
with it a new political and bureaucratic elite and political agenda 
(Bilgin, 2008). In its first term of office, the government made Turkey’s 
EU accession process the main priority of Turkish foreign policy, 
starting formal accession negotiations with the EU on 3 October 2005. 
Many reforms were introduced, including in the fields of minority 
rights, abolition of death penalty, human rights and the Kurdish 
issue, especially between 2000 and 2005 (which includes the pre-JDP 
coalition government’s term in office).
During the JDP Party’s second term (2007-2011), the government 
emphasized cultural proximity with neighbouring countries. Meanwhile, 
Turkey’s democracy and growing economy provided a political and 
discursive basis for a new multi-dimensional and proactive foreign policy 
in addition to the country’s geostrategic importance (Keyman, 2009, p. 5). 
The logic of JDP Party’s foreign policy approach was to play a leadership 
role in the Muslim world while it was trying to participate in initiatives with 
the West, such as the Dialogue of Civilisations (Öniş and Yılmaz, 2009).
At the same time, the government attempted to construct Turkey 
as a ‘centre’ country. Thus, Turkey became more active in international 
organizations like the G-20, the Organization of Islamic Cooperation 
(OIC), and it became a temporary member of the UN Security Council 
for 2009-2010 period. Due to its growing economy and proactive foreign 
policy in various parts of the world, Turkey sometimes became referred 
to as a ‘model country’ or an ‘inspiration’ for other countries in the 
Islamic world (Keyman, 2009, p.12). Kirişçi (2011, p.35-45) argues that 
Turkey’s ‘demonstrative effect’ is based on three developments: firstly, 
Turkey’s rise as a ‘trading state’, which makes it more visible through trade 
S. Öner
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and investment; secondly, the diffusion of Turkey’s democratization 
experience; and thirdly, Turkey’s new foreign policy paradigm which 
includes policies encouraging regional integration through free 
movement of goods and people between Turkey and the Middle East. 
For example, visa requirements for Moroccan and Tunisian nationals 
were lifted in 2007, and for Syrian, Lebanese and Jordanian nationals 
in 2009. Turkey also mediated conflicts between several regional actors, 
and between them and the West. Inspired by the EU as an international 
actor, for which the term soft power is frequently used, Turkey has 
in turn become an inspiration for other countries, especially in the 
Middle East (Kahraman, 2011, p. 711). Turkey’s regional and global 
engagements have even expanded to Africa, Asia and Latin America. 
However, this increasing proactivity in regions like the Middle East and 
the Balkans has also been criticized as reflecting a ‘neo-Ottomanism’ 
(Ulusoy, 2005, p. 245), although Kalın (2011, p. 10), the former head 
of the Office of Public Diplomacy, rejects such claims about Turkey’s 
recent foreign policy; he considers these tendencies as representing a 
reconciliation between Turkey and its history and geography.
More recently, Turkey’s self-confidence has increased by its ability to 
maintain economic growth during the financial crisis in the Eurozone 
and its proactive foreign policy. In the third term of the JDP government 
(2011-2015), Turkey acted more as an independent regional power in 
the Middle East while emphasising mutual economic interests and a 
common Muslim identity (Öniş, 2014, p. 5). However, Turkey’s rising 
soft power faced challenges, especially after the Arab uprisings in that the 
new foreign policy paradigm, based on ‘zero problems with neighbours’, 
has had to deal with the realities of international politics (Kirişçi, 2011, 
p. 46), especially with respect to Syria. Whereas, at the beginning of 
the Arab Spring, there were discussions as to whether Turkey can be 
a ‘model’ or an ‘inspiration’ for those countries4, after a while, these 
discussions were replaced by critiques of Turkey’s over-engagement in 
the domestic politics of several Arab states, as it became more deeply 
involved in their internal sectarian conflicts.
4) TESEV’s public opinion surveys in the Arab world show that Turkey has been quite 
attractive in the region. This attractiveness comes from a  proactive Turkish foreign 
policy, the perception of Turkey’s successful socio-economic transformation in the last 
decade and an increase of Turkish cultural products, particularly Turkish TV series in 
the region. The popularity of these series has been influential in raising the number of 
visitors to Turkey from Arab countries (Benli Altunışık, 2011, p. 1).
External and Domestic Challenges and Prospects for Turkey
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Turkey’s increasingly friendly relations with Syria between 1999 and 
2008, which led to the lifting of visa requirements, was one of the main 
examples of how Turkey’s soft power was rising in the region. However, 
a civil war then started in Syria with the anti-government uprisings in 
2011. The authoritarian political leader Basher el-Assad has been able 
to hold on to power, in spite of strong resistance from various societal 
forces (Lesch, 2013; cited in Öniş, 2014, p. 2). Currently, Turkey’s 
relations with Syria are as securitised as they were in the 1990s, and 
Turkey’s foreign policy towards Syria has been transformed from soft 
to hard power (Demiryol, 2014, p. 10). Nevertheless, at the same time, 
Turkey has played an important role in providing humanitarian aid 
and welcoming a large number of Syrian refugees. However, the JDP’s 
proactive  foreign policy has not succeeded in facilitating regime change 
in Syria, nor has it helped establish and maintain a democratic order in 
Egypt; on the contrary, it has moved more towards entangling Turkey 
in the region’s sectarian conflicts and deeply engaging it in the domestic 
politics of certain Arab states (Öniş, 2014, p. 1).
In the case of Egypt, its first democratic experiment with an 
elected government ended with a military coup that removed the 
democratically-elected President Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood 
from power. In Libya, the post-Qaddafi situation is very uncertain, with 
extreme polarization in Libyan society. Only in Tunisia have several 
positive steps been taken towards political liberalisation (Öniş, 2014, 
p. 2). Given this context, one of the main challenges for Turkey’s soft 
power has become how to balance its relations with authoritarian and 
reformist regimes. This is also related to the question of which political 
forces will gain power during the transition process in these countries. 
This new context requires differential treatment of Turkey’s neighbours 
and consideration of their local characteristics. In addition, it is now 
necessary to balance ‘Turkey’s historical/cultural and idealist vision 
with more pragmatism and realpolitik’ (Kahraman, 2011, p. 706). 
As a result of its involvement in the Arab Spring, Turkey is no longer 
seen as a neutral actor in the region (Akdeniz, 2013, p. 5). As Öniş 
(2014, p. 2) argues, Turkey has been an ‘increasingly assertive regional 
power’ in recent years, who is usually perceived as a country that takes 
sides in the internal problems of Middle Eastern countries. Yet, despite 
its foreign policy activism, Turkey’s ability to influence the political 
transformations in the Middle East has been very limited. The over-
activism of Turkish foreign policy, especially in Egypt and Syria, has 
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led to several criticisms both by some domestic actors, particularly the 
opposition parties, and within the international community. Turkey’s 
recent interventionist and sectarian foreign policy understanding has 
contradicted the traditionally peaceful and non-interventionist nature 
of its foreign policy and its role as a mediator (Elman, 2013, p. 3).
According to the Turkish think tank TESEV’s reports on the 
‘Perception of Turkey in the Middle East’ in 2011 and 2012 (2013, p. 6), 
it was the most favourably-thought-of country. However, in 2013 the 
United Arab Emirates was the favourite (67%), followed by Saudi Arabia 
(60%) and then Turkey (59%). However, in 2013, Turkey is still perceived 
as a regional model with 51%, although Syrians had the least positive 
perception of Turkey as a model with 22%. Respondents viewing Turkey 
as a regional model emphasize its economy and democratic regime.
Thus, there are several internal and external factors that have 
influenced Turkey’s soft power in the 21st century. The main external 
development is the Arab uprisings because it has made Turkey’s 
neighbourhood more insecure, which in turn has made it harder for 
Turkey to act as a soft power. Another external crucial challenge is the 
stagnation in Turkey-EU negotiations, which has influenced the decline 
in the momentum of the reform process in Turkey. This has reduced 
Turkey’s attractiveness as an ‘inspiration’ to other Middle East countries.
The Role of the EU in Turkey’s Soft Power
After the Helsinki Summit in December 1999, when Turkey was given 
official candidate status, the Europeanization of Turkey, which was the 
priority of the JDP government’s foreign policy during its first term of 
government (2002-2007), positively influenced Turkey’s soft power, 
especially through the introduction of several reforms in the areas of 
democracy, human rights and minority rights. These reforms decreased the 
military’s political influence and strengthened Turkish civil society. Öniş 
(2009, p. 8-9) argues that these reforms lead to a closer involvement of new 
actors in Turkish foreign policy, such as business organisations and CSOs. 
The EU also played its part in these reforms by providing funds for Turkish 
civil society projects and opportunities for new interactions between civil 
society in Turkey and EU member states, thereby increasing the number 
of Turkish CSOs and professionalisation of Turkish civil society.
However, following their launch in October 2005, the EU accession 
negotiations rapidly stalled because of the Cyprus issue and the resolute 
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opposition to Turkey’s full membership by the French and German 
governments, who are the major motors of European integration. Till now, 
sixteen chapters have been opened but only one could be provisionally 
closed. In addition, the level of support of Turkish public opinion for the 
EU process has decreased in parallel with these developments.5
Especially during the second term (2007-2011) of the JDP 
government, Turkey developed a proactive multidimensional foreign 
policy. Although declining in recent years particularly after the economic 
crisis, only Turkey’s relations with the EU exert transformative power 
over Turkey. Therefore, these relations are crucial if Turkey wants to 
act as a key actor for promoting democracy in its neighbouring regions 
(Öniş, 2014, p. 15). The Arab world started to take a closer interest in 
Turkey, especially after membership negotiations started with the EU, 
and several public opinion surveys show that Turkey’s contributions to 
the region’s stability, economic and political development are closely 
linked to Turkey’s relations with the EU (Kirişçi, 2011, p. 34-49) and 
progress in the  reform process in Turkey.
The Customs Union between Turkey and the EU since 1996, and 
the prospect of EU accession raised the competitiveness of Turkish 
industry and improved Turkey’s position as a destination for Foreign 
Direct Investment (FDI). Meanwhile, there has been an increase in 
Turkish trade with its non-EU neighbours, which has led to a reduction 
in the EU’s share of Turkish exports from 56% in 2002 to 38% in 2012. 
However, the future of the Turkish and EU economies will remain 
intertwined (The Independent Commission on Turkey, 2014, p. 27-31). 
In spite of a decline in recent years, Turkey’s primary trading partner is 
still the EU, accounting about 40% of its total trade in 2012. The EU is 
also the largest foreign investor in Turkey, accounting for three-quarters 
of FDI inflows to Turkey (Akdeniz, 2013, p. 1).
The Arab Spring created a much more difficult foreign policy 
environment for both Turkey and the EU in their common neighbourhood. 
Developments in Turkey’s neighbourhood have brought to the forefront 
its relations with Europe in political and security terms; the EU has 
become the priority for Turkey again also economically with the setbacks 
in economic relations with its neighbours. Thus, the acceleration of the 
momentum of domestic reforms and economic growth can regenerate 
Turkey’s soft power potential (Akdeniz, 2013, p. 5).
5) For further detail, see Eurobarometer surveys.
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The latest report of the Independent Commission on Turkey (2014) 
stated that, although the Turkish government has remained in principle 
committed to the EU accession process, it has seemed to attach less 
importance to the EU process since 2007. 
While there has been an ongoing transformation processes in the 
Middle East, Turkey has been seen as an ‘inspiration’ because of having a 
secular democracy while having a predominantly Muslim population. One 
of the main sources of the legitimacy of Turkey’s role as an ‘inspiration’ has 
been its domestic transformation in accordance with EU values and norms 
during the EU integration process (Oğuzlu, 2013, p. 11). That is, as Aydın-
Düzgit and Keyman (2014) argue, it is mostly Turkey’s EU membership 
prospect that makes it an attractive example of regional democracy.
The EU and Turkey have established a regular foreign policy dialogue 
which has intensified in recent years. The EU’s former High Representative 
for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Catherine Ashton and Turkish 
former Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu had regular constructive talks 
since 2010, on issues including the Western Balkans, Middle East and 
North Africa, Russia and Central Asia (The Report of the Independent 
Commission on Turkey, 2014, p. 43-44). In spite of the intensification 
of this political dialogue between the EU and Turkey concerning 
international issues of common interest, Turkey’s alignment with relevant 
EU declarations and Council decisions has remained at only around 50% 
in recent years. There are many divergent Turkish and EU positions on 
key issues, such as military intervention in Egypt. On the other hand, the 
‘Positive Agenda’ was initiated by the Commission to complement the 
negotiation process. In December 2012, the Commission prepared a road 
map for visa liberalisation with Turkey, which includes the requirements 
that need to be fulfilled by Turkey, including implementation of the 
readmission agreement. Turkey signed the readmission agreement in 
December 2013 and the visa liberalisation process will take place in 
three years’ time, if the necessary steps for implementing readmission 
agreement will have been taken by Turkey (Akdeniz, 2013, p. 2).
Especially since the crisis in the Eurozone and stagnation in the 
negotiation process, the desirability of becoming an EU member has 
gradually decreased in Turkey, which has weakened the EU’s role as an 
anchor of democratic reform in Turkey (Cenker Özek and Oğuzlu, 2013, 
p. 697). Yet, in spite of these challenges, the EU still provides the best 
anchor for Turkey to consolidate its democracy and improve freedoms, 
develop economically and increase its regional influence (Akdeniz, 
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2013, p. 10). Indeed, several scholars, including Keyman, Aydın and 
Açıkmeşe, consider that this anchor is still crucial.6 However, Turkey 
also needs some positive signals from the EU because the enthusiasm 
of Turkish public opinion for the EU has decreased significantly in 
recent years. Lifting of Schengen visas for Turkish citizens could be an 
important positive signal. In addition, opening new chapters, especially 
chapter 23 on Judiciary and Fundamental Rights and Chapter 24 on 
Justice Freedom and Security, may help revitalize the reform process in 
Turkey in these policy fields, where there are still crucial deficiencies.
Domestic Challenges Facing Turkey’s Soft Power
The ‘image’ of a country is crucial for its soft power. To improve its 
image, Turkey has to maintain its economic growth and develop towards 
a pluralist democracy. As Oğuzlu (2013, p. 12) puts it, ‘soft power begins 
at home’, adding that ‘legitimacy and attractiveness abroad comes with 
legitimacy and attractiveness at home’. The JDP government emphasizes 
Turkey’s internal transformation as the most important source of 
Turkey’s soft power abroad. Turkey’s ability to influence regional 
developments and to become an ‘inspiration’ for the other countries 
depends on its ability to continue the reform process and evolve into 
a pluralist democracy. Thus, Turkey’s internal characteristics and its 
domestic transformation process play a crucial role in its soft power. 
Turkey’s attractiveness as a source of ‘inspiration’ for transitional regimes 
in the Middle East will be influenced by whether Turkey maintains 
its high economic growth rates while continuing to democratize. As 
Oğuzlu (2013, p. 15) argues, ‘plural democracy, rather than majoritarian 
democracy needs to take root at home’.
Moreover, inconsistencies in the government’s policies and rhetoric 
in foreign policy and domestic politics have reduced its reliability. 
For example, the JDP government harshly criticized the military 
coup in Egypt, and was critical of EU leaders for not being equally 
critical and responsive. However, this high level of sensitivity and pro-
democratization rhetoric towards events in other countries are not 
credible and consistent because of crucial deficiencies in Turkey’s own 
democratic credentials and pluralist political order (Öniş, 2014, p. 15).
6) For further detail, see Fuat Keyman, “Globalization, Modernity and Democracy”; 
Mustafa Aydın and Sinem A. Açıkmeşe, “Europeanization through EU Conditionality: 
Understanding the New Era in Turkish Foreign Policy”, Journal of Southern Europe 
and the Balkans, Vol. 9, No. 3, 2007, p. 263-274.
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On the other hand, in recent years, freedom of expression and freedom 
of the press has narrowed in Turkey. In February 2014, for example, 
the Turkish Parliament passed a new Internet law which allows the 
telecommunications authority to block any website within 24 hours and 
requires all internet providers to store data on users’ activities and make 
it available to authorities on request. While, in 2005, Turkey ranked 
98th out of 178 countries in the Reporters Without Borders’ Annual 
Index of Press Freedom, it dropped to 154th in 2013 (The Report of the 
Independent Commission on Turkey, 2014, p. 15). Because of all these 
internal problems, EU membership prospect still has a crucial role for 
democratization of Turkey.
The deepening polarisation in Turkey between political actors and 
within society also hinders the consolidation of its democracy (The 
Report of the Independent Commission, 2014, p. 46).  Moreover, the 
rise of PKK terrorist attacks and DAESH terrorism in Turkey, have 
increased the role of security and have challenged the balance between 
freedom and democracy especially since July 2015. Thus, in spite of 
its deficiencies, the EU accession process is still crucial for Turkey for 
sustaining its transformation and democratisation.
Concluding Remarks 
Turkey, which has a democratic and secular political system with a 
predominantly Muslim population and, since 1999, the prospect of 
EU membership, has had an increasing influence in its neighbouring 
regions especially during the first decade of the 21st century. The first and 
second JDP governments tried to contribute to regional peace through 
constructive engagement and mediation efforts. Turkey’s ‘zero problems 
policy’ approach contributed to Turkey’s soft power, which includes a 
liberal visa policy with its neighbours and increasing communication 
and cooperation in the fields of economics, politics and culture. 
However, the strategy of externally promoting and projecting 
Turkish culture, which lies at the core of the country’s soft power, is 
insufficient as long as hard power and uncertainty dominate in the 
Middle East (Benli Altunışık, 2011, p. 2-3). As Oğuzlu (2007, p. 95) 
argues, when threats and challenges to Turkey’s own security go on, 
it will probably lead to an increase in its tendencies to act as a ‘hard 
power’. Similarly, growing tensions between Turkey and Syria, the rise of 
terrorism, stalled negotiations with the EU, and the loss of momentum 
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of the reform process, particularly regarding freedoms of speech and 
the media, have reduced Turkey’s soft power in recent years. 
As Kaya (2013, p. 57-59) argues, there is a difference between the ways 
in which the JDP government and the pro-European groups perceive the 
sources of Turkey’s becoming a regional soft power. The JDP emphasizes 
cultural and historical ties in its neighbouring regions, while pro-European 
groups in Turkey mostly believe that ‘Turkey’s growing regional influence 
derives from its European perspective’. As Öniş (2014, p. 14-15) argues, 
Turkey can have crucial influence in its region by becoming a reference 
point through its level of economic development and by improving its 
democratic credentials. Thus, Turkey’s ability to act as a ‘role model’ for 
the region will depend mostly on maintaining and improving its economic 
situation and overcoming its democratic deficits by consolidating its 
democracy. Especially during the third-term of the JDP government, 
Turkey has implemented a more interventionist proactive foreign 
policy in the region with increasing self-confidence. However, Turkey’s 
foreign policy in the Middle East after the Arab uprisings, especially 
towards Egypt and Syria, show the ‘limits on the constructive impact of 
unilateral activism’ (Öniş, 2014, p. 15), which indicates the importance of 
‘cooperative action through multilateral channels’.
The recent failed coup attempt which on 15 July 2016, shows that 
in spite of the polarisation in the society different parts of the society 
and all of the political parties represented at Turkish Parliament stood 
against the coup attempt. The developments after the coup attempt will 
be very crucial for Turkish democracy and Turkey’s position as a regional 
power. In order to be an influential regional power which promotes 
peace and stability in its region Turkey needs to overcome polarisation 
within the society and go on the reform process particularly in the fields 
of freedom of speech, freedom of media and rule of law.
Consequently, there are several internal and external challenges 
influencing Turkey’s regional power in the second decade of the 21st 
century. The biggest external challenges include the Syrian crisis and 
the growing influence of extremist Islamist groups, such as DAESH 
(The Report of the Independent Commission on Turkey, 2014, p. 42). 
One of the main domestic factors which influence Turkey’s soft power 
is the Kurdish issue, which is also influenced by external regional 
developments. Secondly the integration of Syrian asylum seekers in 
Turkey is crucial. Thirdly the attitude of the government regarding 
freedom of speech, freedom of the media and individual liberties will 
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also influence Turkey’s soft power. If Turkey can re-start its reform 
process in these fields then this will help Turkey move towards a more 
pluralist democracy. These developments would also bring a new 
dynamic to the stalled negotiations with the EU. Improvements in these 
domestic fields will improve Turkey’s soft power. Thus, the EU anchor 
is still crucial in Turkey’s transformation process for overcoming all 
these domestic challenges which will make Turkey more a country of 
‘inspiration’ in its region. As Nye (2009, p. 162-163) argues, in today’s 
world, success is not only based on ‘whose army wins but also of whose 
story wins’. To create its own successful story, which is crucial for soft 
power, Turkey has to overcome its deficiencies in its democracy, improve 
its economic position, increase its economic growth rates and develop a 
more constructive, balanced, multilateral and consistent understanding 
of Turkish foreign policy. 
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